Opportunity and attention

You can't change who's out tonight. You can change some of the circumstances you walk into: where you are, when, who's with you, what you carry, and how much of your attention is on the street rather than a screen. Criminologists have a theory built on exactly that, and it's the most useful tool this course has for your own risk. Alongside it comes advice sold with more confidence than the research can carry: "be aware", "walk with purpose", "trust your gut". Each of those gets taken apart here, with the strength of the evidence under it.

Lesson 3, "Who is harmed, by whom, where and when", gave you the measured risks. This lesson asks what part of a risk is yours to change. A frame for lowering your own odds is not a verdict on anyone who was harmed. The research below is easy to turn into one, and wherever it could be, the lesson says why the evidence can't carry it.

Three things that have to meet

Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson called it a routine activity approach, and their 1979 paper in the American Sociological Review states the idea in one sentence: "Most criminal acts require convergence in space and time of likely offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians against crime."¹ Three things have to meet at one place and one time. For what they called direct-contact predatory crime, they argued, take any one of the three away and that crime, there and then, can't be completed.¹

The paper also made a deliberate turn, which is the reason this course uses the theory: "Rather than emphasizing the characteristics of offenders, with this approach we concentrate upon the circumstances in which they carry out predatory criminal acts."¹ The theory has no need to know who is a criminal, why they offend, or what they look like, only what the situation is.

Their mechanism is convergence. They hypothesised that "the dispersion of activities away from households and families increases the opportunity for crime and thus generates higher crime rates".¹ Nobody had to become more criminal for crime to rise. The everyday pattern of life put more targets in more places with fewer guardians, and offenders met them more often.

That gives you three levers, one for each element:

• Be a less suitable target. Less on show, less within reach, a locked door.
• Add guardianship. A person who is with you, or who knows your plan and will act if it breaks; neighbours; staff; light and visibility.
• Change the convergence. A different route, time or routine, so the things that have to meet meet less often.

Notice that the first lever is about what's available, not about how you look or walk. A suitable target in Cohen and Felson's sense is a thing or a person in a situation, and the situation is what you can alter.

Digital Literacy lesson 1 did something similar for a computer. It built a security plan from five questions: what you have, who might want it, how likely they are to try, how bad it would be, and how much trouble you will go to. It also met the folk picture of attackers as burglars, opportunists after identity information, and said that picture produces sensible avoidance. The triangle asks the same questions about your evening: the burglar picture, with a research literature behind it.

Situational prevention: changing the situation on purpose

Situational crime prevention is the practice. It grew out of British government research in the 1960s and 1970s, and it draws on routine activity theory among other ideas.² R. V. Clarke, one of its founders, defined it in his introduction to Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (1997): "Situational prevention comprises opportunity-reducing measures that (1) are directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible, (3) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders."²

Two parts of that do the work. "Specific": not crime in general but this crime, here. And the last clause, which gives the ways to change a situation. Cornish and Clarke laid those out in 2003 as a grid of twenty-five techniques under five headings: Increase the Effort, Increase the Risks, Reduce the Rewards, Reduce Provocations, Remove Excuses.³

Most of the grid is written for people who design places and run organisations: steering locks, entry phones, street closures, two clerks in a convenience store. A handful of entries are on a personal scale. Under "Extend guardianship" the grid lists "Take routine precautions: go out in group at night, leave signs of occupancy, carry phone".³ Under Reduce the Rewards, it has concealing targets and removing them. And a whole column, Reduce Provocations, is about lowering frustration and avoiding disputes (efficient queues, polite service, less crowding in pubs), which lesson 8, "Talking it down", builds on.³

Two cautions before you use it. First, applying a grid written for planners and managers to your own walk home is this course's step, not Clarke's; the grid tells you where to look, not what works for you. Second, not everything in it is settled. Burglar alarms sit in the grid under "Strengthen formal surveillance", and lesson 5, "Home, the door and the doorstep", sets out the dispute over whether an alarm protects a home at all.³

Lesson 3 connects here too. Its findings that repeats tend to come quickly, and that a major reason for them is offenders taking later advantage of what the first offence revealed, are the grid's "remove targets" with a date on it: after something happens, close the opening the offender used, and do it soon. As lesson 3 said, the advice is sensible, untested.

Doesn't crime just move next door?

The commonest objection to all this is displacement: block one opportunity and the offender uses another nearby, so nothing is gained. Clarke's answer was that the assumption "is not supported by empirical research which has generally found rather little displacement."²

This is a contested empirical question with a strong lean, and it pays to be exact about what this course has. It read Clarke's summary of the research as it stood in 1997, not the evaluations behind it, and it read no later review of them in full, so it gives no figure for how often displacement happens. What the summary supports is narrower than "precautions always work": when researchers looked, crime seldom reappeared next door in full.

What the frame claims, and what it doesn't

Situational prevention has critics from every direction, and Clarke, one of its main proponents, set them out himself. From the Right, he wrote, it looks like an "irrelevant response to crime because it neglects issues of moral culpability and punishment", and as infringing the freedom and privacy of people who have done nothing wrong. From the Left, it is called "politically and socially naive in its neglect of the role of social and economic inequities in causation", and of who has the power to define what counts as crime. Liberals say that by "tinkering" with symptoms it diverts attention from the need to tackle the "root causes" of crime, such as, in his summary of their view, unemployment, racial discrimination, poor housing and schooling, and inconsistent parenting.²

He also recorded worries about how the measures are used. One is a "fortress society", the phrase lesson 1 met in Warr: people so afraid they barricade themselves in. Clarke thought experience had dispelled some of that fear, though not all. Another is that the measures can be used by the powerful to keep out people they see as undesirable, and he names the poor, minorities and young people, kept out of malls, parks and town centres. He replied that many such measures serve people who are far from rich, and gave examples from public housing and a low-income neighbourhood.²

Then comes blame. Clarke first raises "blaming the victim" about businesses: asking shops to change practices that invite theft risks being dismissed on those grounds. He then turns to victim advocates, who in his account resist any suggestion that victims are responsible because it could set back better rights and treatment for victims. His reply, quoting a piece he wrote with Felson, is that routine precautions let people take responsibility without accepting criminal blame or even civil liability, and do not exempt offenders from criminal responsibility: a person who locks her car still has a right to expect nobody steals it, locked or not.²

This is a proponent describing his critics, not the critics' case in their own words. Lesson 6, "Out and away", gives the strongest version of it, from researchers who argue that safety advice aimed at women restricts them and makes them responsible for preventing violence, and sets it beside the case for teaching skills.

What this course takes from all of it is the limit of the frame. Routine activity theory and situational prevention are tools for lowering your own odds. They offer no theory of why people offend, they say nothing about anyone harmed failing to take a precaution, and nothing in them moves responsibility for a crime away from the person who committed it. That last point is the course's one value commitment, and it holds whatever the frame says about odds.

Martin's walk to the bus

Martin is a hospital porter. Most nights his shift ends at eleven, and he walks ten minutes from the staff entrance to a bus stop on the main road. The shortest way is diagonally across the staff car park and down a service lane; the longer way follows the lit road past the hospital's front entrance, and adds about three minutes. He usually takes the short cut, on the phone to his partner, because it's the only time in the day they get to talk. He has had no trouble so far, and he'd like to keep it that way without giving up the call.

Nothing here says Martin is at fault for anything, now or if something ever happened. The question is only what in this situation he can change, and what each change is worth.

Step 1: the target. What does Martin have on show? A phone, in his hand, which is worth taking. And with his attention on the call he notices less of his surroundings: the next section has the evidence for that much, and it measured noticing, not crime. The change: make the call from the bus stop or the bus, and walk with the phone in a pocket. Label it sensible, untested.

Step 2: guardianship. Who is with Martin, or knows where he is? Nobody on the walk, though his partner is on the line, and how much a person on the phone could do is a fair question. The changes: walk with a colleague who finishes at the same time; ask whether the hospital's security staff will walk people out; if the call is the point of the walk, agree to message from the bus instead. Each adds someone who notices, or someone who knows the plan and will act if it breaks. Label them sensible, untested. The grid's "go out in group at night" is the same idea.

Step 4: the cost. Lesson 1 gave you Jackson and Gray's test for whether a worry is working for you: it leads to a precaution, the precaution makes you feel safer, and neither shrinks your life. Martin's changes cost him a pocketed phone for ten minutes, a message instead of the walk-time call some nights, and three minutes of walking. That passes. A version that had him stop taking the late shift, or dread every walk, would fail it, and nothing in the evidence asks for that.

Awareness is attention

"Be aware of your surroundings" is one of the commonest pieces of safety advice, and one of the least defined. The clearest evidence this course found on what awareness is, and what degrades it, comes from outside criminology altogether: a psychology study with a clown in it.

Hyman and colleagues reported two studies in 2010 in Applied Cognitive Psychology.⁴ In the first they found that "cell phone users walked more slowly, changed directions more frequently, and were less likely to acknowledge other people than individuals in the other conditions." In the second came the clown, and phone users "were less likely to notice an unusual activity along their walking route (a unicycling clown)."⁴

Percentage of walkers in each condition who had noticed the unicycling clown, from Hyman and colleagues (2010): 151 walkers, 24 of them on a phone, on one campus in a single hour one spring afternoon. All bars drawn to one scale. It measures noticing an unusual event, not crime.

The authors' name for what happened to the phone users is inattentional blindness: failing to see something plainly in view because attention is taken up elsewhere. Their account is divided attention. A conversation takes a share of attention that walking alone, or walking to music, leaves free, and they suggest phone use may produce this even during something as undemanding as walking.⁴ This is their account of their result, and this course adds no cognitive science to it.

Now the limits, which matter as much as the result. It's one campus, one spring afternoon, 151 walkers of whom 24 were on a phone, with phones as they were then. The researchers watched whoever came by rather than assigning anyone to a condition, and they say themselves that something about people who choose to phone while walking may be the cause rather than the call. And it measured whether people noticed a clown, not whether anyone was approached, followed or robbed. So the study is good evidence that people on a phone call noticed less, and nearby evidence, not proof, for the advice built on it. "Put the phone away while you walk somewhere unfamiliar or late" is sensible, untested: nobody has measured whether it prevents a crime.

Two other things in the chart are worth a sentence. People with music players noticed the clown at least as often as people walking alone, and the authors conclude that using a device was not by itself what distracted people. So this study gives no support to the common rule that earphones make you a target, and no refutation of it either: it measured noticing, not whether anyone was targeted, and nothing this course read measured whether earphones change anyone's risk. And pairs noticed most of all, about what you'd expect from combining two people's chances, the authors say. Hyman's team studied noticing, not crime, so the link is this course's, not theirs, but it makes a neat picture of Cohen and Felson's guardian: two people notice more than one.

What awareness isn't

Put those together and awareness, as this course uses the word, is noticing what is around you and thinking a step ahead about what might happen next. It is attention, and attention is limited and easy to spend elsewhere.

It isn't scanning every face for danger, or staying frightened. Lesson 1 drew the line: worry that leads to a precaution, which makes you feel safer and leaves your life about the size it was, is functional; worry that shrinks a life is the kind that costs. Awareness that works looks like a habit you barely notice, such as the phone in the pocket for ten minutes, not a state of alarm you carry everywhere.

Nor does it need a theory of who is dangerous. Martin's changes were about where his own attention was and who was with him, not about watching anyone in particular.

What the walking studies measured

"Predators pick victims by how they walk, so walk confidently and you won't be picked" is a common line in self-defence writing. It rests on a real line of research. What that research measured is narrower than the claim, and the gap between the two is this section.

Where it started

In 1981 Betty Grayson and Morris Stein published "Attracting assault: victims' nonverbal cues" in the Journal of Communication. This course read only its ERIC abstract and later researchers' accounts of it, not the paper. The abstract describes "a study in which prison inmates convicted of assault identified potential victims from videotapes", and a coding system used "to determine which nonverbal body movement categories differentiated victims and nonvictims."⁵ As quoted by a later team, the paper argued that "potential victims may be signaling their vulnerability to would-be assailants through gestures, posture and exaggerated movement".⁶ Numbers for how many people were filmed and how many inmates rated them circulate widely; since this course never read the paper, it gives none.

A 2010 master's thesis by Sarah Wheeler at Brock University, whose literature review is a short account of this whole line of work, summarises the cues that study found: the people judged most vulnerable "displayed longer or shorter strides, and weight that shifted up/down, forward/back, or side-to-side. They also tended to use only one side or part of their body when moving, and tended to lift their feet."⁷

Dots of light

Gunns and colleagues' point-light study found that "Both female (Experiment 1) and male (Experiment 2) walkers could be differentiated according to ease-of-attack based solely on the kinematic information provided whilst walking."⁶ Specific walking features predicted the ratings, and in a third experiment, variations in walking caused by different clothing and footwear predicted differences in ratings.⁶ That is about how raters judged moving points of light. It says nothing about why anyone is attacked, and on this course's one value commitment, what someone wore never puts the blame on them.

The authors were careful about what that shows, and their limits are the most important sentences in this line of research. Their raters made judgements of how easy someone would be to attack; they didn't attempt any assaults. To say the raters were accurate, the authors wrote, you would have to show that the people rated easiest to attack actually were easiest to attack, which the study did not do. And the raters were told to judge ease of attack; whether anyone would pay attention to such cues without being asked, the authors said, is unknown.⁶

Wheeler's thesis makes the design point about the whole early literature. Grayson and Stein, she notes, filmed real people walking, but "their study design did not include a comparison of ratings with target demographics either", and later point-light studies used the same design.⁷ In plain terms, most of these studies measure whether people look easy to attack to someone asked to rate them. They don't check the ratings against whether the people rated had in fact been victimised.

Checking the ratings against real lives

Two later studies from a Canadian group went further. This course read the abstract of each, and nothing more.

Book and colleagues (2013) showed short clips of people walking to 47 inmates of a maximum-security penitentiary in Ontario, who judged how vulnerable each was. The inmates who scored higher on the interpersonal and emotional side of psychopathy, measured with a standard assessment called the PCL-R, were more accurate, and more likely to explain their judgements by mentioning the walk.⁸ The abstract doesn't say what "accuracy" was measured against, and the abstract is all this course read.

Fulham and colleagues (2020) coded people's walking for vulnerability cues, with some walkers knowing they were being filmed and some not. Walking style was associated with a history of victimisation, "but only in the Unaware condition": that is, only among people unaware they were being filmed. In a second study, of female university students, the authors found that hypervigilance, a constant watchfulness for threat, changed the link between sexual victimisation and walking style, and concluded that "hypervigilance may be an adaptive response that reduces perceived vulnerability in sexually victimized women."⁹ That is a finding about how people's walking looked, not advice to live on guard. The authors' analysis treats the harm as coming first and the walk as changing afterwards; one analysis can't prove that order, and the abstract claims only the association.⁹

What that adds up to

So "does a confident walk prevent attack?" is a contested question, and "not shown" is the honest answer on prevention. What would settle it is a study that followed people over time, trained some of them and not others, and counted what happened to each group. This course found no published one.

Two sentences the evidence cannot carry

Martin's walk was the simple case. This one has a wrinkle, and it comes in two halves.

Nadia, a friend of yours, says over coffee: "I walk with purpose, so I'm never picked." Sort it the way the table does. The first half, walking with purpose, may well make her look harder to attack to a rater; the studies support that much. The second half, "never picked", is a claim about attacks, and no study here measured attacks. And "never picked" is missing a comparison: most people aren't picked on most walks, however they walk, so her own record can't tell her whether the walk is doing anything. Her habit costs nothing, which is fine: sensible, untested, in this course's labels. The sentence is what outruns the evidence.

Now the inverse, which is where this literature gets misused. Suppose someone you know was attacked, and a third person says: "She was picked because of how she walked." Take it apart on the evidence.

The studies measured how raters judged walkers. None showed that any attacker, in a real street, chose anyone because of their walk, and the Gunns team said plainly that their design couldn't show raters were even accurate. Where a link with victimisation was found, as in Fulham's first study, it was with a history of harm that had already happened, and the authors modelled the harm as coming first. Lesson 3 showed that in both countries most women who are killed are killed by someone they know, and that in England and Wales, of victims of rape or assault by penetration since age 16, fewer than one in five were attacked by a stranger and fewer than one in ten on a street, in a car park, a park or another open public space. How someone walks down a street has no obvious bearing on harm from a partner at home. That point is this course's reasoning, not a finding of the walking studies. And under all of it is the course's commitment: responsibility for an attack lies with the person who made it. Precautions change the odds. They don't move the blame.

Warning signs are things people do

One piece of advice this course read ends in the gut. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, the UK's personal safety charity, tells people who think they're being followed to trust their instincts and act, and its festival advice says to watch for aggressive behaviour from others and to get away from it.¹⁰ The US State Department's page for women travellers says something close without naming instinct: in an unsafe situation it can help to speak loudly, and "Being safe is more important than being polite."¹¹

Look at what sets each of these off: being followed; aggressive behaviour; an unsafe situation. Each is something happening, not the look of a person. This course takes that and makes it a rule. A warning sign is something a person does, never how they look. Here are examples, and the list is this course's, not any one source's:

• someone who keeps coming closer after you've stepped back;
• someone who carries on after you've said no, or who treats "no" as the start of a negotiation;
• someone who follows you across a road and back again;
• someone who places themselves between you and the only way out;
• someone who tries to move you somewhere less visible, a side street, a car, a quieter room.

Not on the list, ever: race, ethnicity, religion, class, clothes, accent, build, tattoos, or looking "out of place". Those are appearance.

Why the rule, when "trust your gut" sounds so natural? This is the course's own argument, not a finding, built on Cohen and Felson. Their frame deliberately turned away from "the characteristics of offenders" to "the circumstances in which they carry out predatory criminal acts".¹ Everything useful in this lesson has come from circumstances: what's on show, who's around, where and when. None of it needed a picture of what an offender looks like. And a feeling set off by how someone looks can carry prejudice as easily as it carries pattern, which puts the cost of a false alarm on people who have done nothing, the same worry Clarke recorded about measures used to keep "undesirables" out of public places.² A feeling set off by what someone is doing is about the situation you're in.

How to label it: "trust your instincts" is advice from an experienced charity, and no study this course read tested it, so the label is practitioner opinion. The course's rule that a cue is behaviour is sensible, untested: it follows from the theory, and nobody has measured it.

None of this is a test that anyone who was harmed failed. Plenty of harm comes with no warning a person could read, much of it from someone the person had every reason to trust, and a feeling you didn't act on, or a moment you froze, was never the cause. The person who chose to do harm was.

What people get wrong

"Walk confidently and you won't be picked." Rating studies find that raters, inmates among them, pick out who looks easy to attack. No study this course read measured whether changing your walk lowers your risk, or whether real attackers choose that way.

"Earphones make you a target." In Hyman's study, people with music players noticed the clown no less often than people walking alone; phone callers were the ones who noticed least. It measured noticing, not being targeted, and nothing this course read measured earphones against risk.

"Awareness means scanning everyone for danger." Awareness is noticing and thinking a step ahead. Phone callers had least of it in Hyman's study and pairs had most, and it needs no theory of who looks dangerous.

"Precautions just move crime next door." Clarke reported that research had generally found rather little displacement. Contested, then, with a strong lean against the objection.

"Trust your gut" as a complete rule. This is practitioner opinion, and a gut feeling about how someone looks can be prejudice. A gut feeling about what someone is doing is worth taking seriously: sensible, untested.

"Safety is about spotting the kind of person who looks dangerous." The theory this course uses works without knowing anything about offenders, and the course uses behaviour, never appearance.

Practice

Connections

Back. Lesson 1's functional worry is the test every change here has to pass, and lesson 3's finding that so much harm comes from people the victim knows is one reason the walking studies can't carry the weight put on them.

Forward. Lesson 5, "Home, the door and the doorstep", applies the grid to the home, where the strongest evidence in the course is, and where the grid's own burglar alarms turn out to be contested. Lesson 6, "Out and away", applies it to the street and to travel, with the evidence on lighting and cameras, and gives the critique of safety advice aimed at women in its own terms. Lesson 8, "Talking it down", starts from the grid's Reduce Provocations column.

Go deeper

• Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson, "Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach", American Sociological Review, 1979. This course read it in full from a copy on a university course page, and checked the abstract against JSTOR's. The abstract alone is worth reading; the paper's first sections show how three plain ideas explained a national crime trend.
• R. V. Clarke, Introduction to Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2nd edition, 1997, free from the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. This course read the Introduction, not the case studies. This is the clearest account of the approach by one of its founders, and it sets out the objections to it in his own summary.
• The Twenty Five Techniques of Situational Prevention, one page, free. Read in full. Use it as a checklist on your own routine, remembering it was written for places and organisations.
• I. E. Hyman and colleagues, "Did you see the unicycling clown?", Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2010. This course read it in full from a copy of the published article. Short and readable, and a model of saying exactly what a study measured.

Sources

1. Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson, "Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach", American Sociological Review 44(4), 1979, pp. 588 to 608. Read: full text, from a copy of the published article on a University of Washington course page; the abstract and the theoretical sections read closely, the data tables skimmed. The abstract's wording checked against JSTOR's page on 25 September 2026; the "direct-contact predatory crime" scope is from the full text.
2. R. V. Clarke (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2nd edition, 1997, Introduction. Read: the Introduction, from the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing's PDF; the definition, displacement and "Philosophical and Ethical Issues" read closely; the case studies not read. The origins, the objections, the two worries and Clarke's replies, and his passage on victim blaming with the reply he quotes from Felson and Clarke (1997) are paraphrased from the Introduction as read on 25 September 2026.
3. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, "Twenty Five Techniques of Situational Prevention", grid after Cornish and Clarke, 2003. Read: in full (one page).
4. I. E. Hyman, S. M. Boss, B. M. Wise, K. E. McKenzie and J. M. Caggiano, "Did you see the unicycling clown? Inattentional blindness while walking and talking on a cell phone", Applied Cognitive Psychology 24, 2010, pp. 597 to 607. Read: full text, from a copy of the published article on a third-party site. The quoted lines checked against the publisher's abstract on 25 September 2026; the percentages, the sample, the single afternoon and the authors' caveat about who chooses to phone are from the full text.
5. Betty Grayson and Morris I. Stein, "Attracting assault: victims' nonverbal cues", Journal of Communication 31(1), 1981, pp. 68 to 75. Read: the ERIC abstract only. The paper itself was not read, and no sample sizes are given.
6. R. E. Gunns, L. Johnston and S. M. Hudson, "Victim selection and kinematics: a point-light investigation of vulnerability to attack", Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 26(3), 2002, pp. 129 to 158. Read: full text, from a copy on a University of Rijeka course page; abstract, introduction and general discussion read closely. The quoted sentence checked against the publisher's abstract on 25 September 2026; the authors' limits are paraphrased from the full text. Grayson and Stein's p. 68 line is quoted as this paper quotes it.
7. Sarah Wheeler, The Convergence of Psychopathy, Self-Rated Vulnerability, and Other-Rated Vulnerability, MA thesis, Brock University, 2010. Read: the literature review (pp. 2 to 9) and the discussion of body language (pp. 36 to 38) in full, from Brock's repository.
8. A. Book, K. Costello and J. A. Camilleri, "Psychopathy and victim selection: the use of gait as a cue to vulnerability", Journal of Interpersonal Violence 28(11), 2013, pp. 2368 to 2383. Read: abstract only. The abstract does not say what accuracy was scored against.
9. L. Fulham, A. S. Book, J. Blais, M. B. Ritchie, N. Y. Gauthier and K. Costello, "The effect of hypervigilance on the relationship between sexual victimization and gait", Journal of Interpersonal Violence 35(19-20), 2020, pp. 4061 to 4082. Read: abstract only.
10. Suzy Lamplugh Trust, "Personal safety out and about", updated 29 May 2025. Read: full page, re-read 25 September 2026.
11. US Department of State, "Women Travelers", travel.state.gov. Read: in full, from Internet Archive capture 20251226183516. The page does not mention instinct.
12. Support lines in the content note, each read on its service's own page on 25 September 2026: Rape Crisis England and Wales, Victim Support, Rape Crisis Scotland, Victim Support Scotland, the Domestic and Sexual Abuse Helpline, Rape Crisis Northern Ireland, Victim Support NI, RAINN and VictimConnect.